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Editors contains: "Stefano Leonardi"

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  1. Stefano Leonardi (Ed.)
    We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered “easy”: multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial auctions with gross substitutes valuations. For both domains we have fast algorithms that find the welfare-maximizing allocation with communication complexity that is poly-logarithmic in the input size. This immediately implies that welfare maximization can be achieved in ex-post equilibrium with no significant communication cost, by using VCG payments. In contrast, we show that in both domains the communication complexity of any dominant strategy implementation that achieves the optimal welfare is polynomial in the input size. We then move on to studying the approximation ratios achievable by dominant strategy mechanisms. For multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values, we provide a dominant-strategy communication FPTAS. For combinatorial auctions with general valuations, we show that there is no dominant strategy mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio better than m1−є that uses poly(m,n) bits of communication, where m is the number of items and n is the number of bidders. In contrast, a randomized dominant strategy mechanism that achieves an O(√m) approximation with poly(m,n) communication is known. This proves the first gap between computationally efficient deterministic dominant strategy mechanisms and randomized ones. En route, we answer an open question on the communication cost of implementing dominant strategy mechanisms for more than two players, and also solve some open problems in the area of simultaneous combinatorial auctions. 
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  2. Stefano Leonardi and Anupam Gupta (Ed.)
    A probabilistic algorithm A is pseudodeterministic if, on every input, there exists a canonical value that is output with high probability. If the algorithm outputs one of k canonical values with high probability, then it is called a k-pseudodeterministic algorithm. In the study of pseudodeterminism, the Acceptance Probability Estimation Problem (APEP), which is to additively approximate the acceptance probability of a Boolean circuit, is emerging as a central computational problem. This problem admits a 2-pseudodeterministic algorithm. Recently, it was shown that a pseudodeterministic algorithm for this problem would imply that any multi-valued function that admits a k-pseudodeterministic algorithm for a constant k (including approximation algorithms) also admits a pseudodeterministic algorithm (Dixon, Pavan, Vinodchandran; ITCS 2021). The contribution of the present work is two-fold. First, as our main conceptual contribution, we establish that the existence of a pseudodeterministic algorithm for APEP is fundamentally related to the gap between probabilistic promise classes and the corresponding standard complexity classes. In particular, we show the following equivalence: APEP has a pseudodeterministic approximation algorithm if and only if every promise problem in PromiseBPP has a solution in BPP. A conceptual interpretation of this equivalence is that the algorithmic gap between 2-pseudodeterminism and pseudodeterminism is equivalent to the gap between PromiseBPP and BPP. Based on this connection, we show that designing pseudodeterministic algorithms for APEP leads to the solution of some open problems in complexity theory, including new Boolean circuit lower bounds. This equivalence also explains how multi-pseudodeterminism is connected to problems in SearchBPP. In particular, we show that if APEP has a pseudodeterministic algorithm, then every problem that admits a k(n)-pseudodeterministic algorithm (for any polynomial k) is in SearchBPP and admits a pseudodeterministic algorithm. Motivated by this connection, we also explore its connection to probabilistic search problems and establish that APEP is complete for certain notions of search problems in the context of pseudodeterminism. Our second contribution is establishing query complexity lower bounds for multi-pseudodeterministic computations. We prove that for every k ≥ 1, there exists a problem whose (k+1)-pseudodeterministic query complexity, in the uniform query model, is O(1) but has a k-pseudodeterministic query complexity of Ω(n), even in the more general nonadaptive query model. A key contribution of this part of the work is the utilization of Sperner’s lemma in establishing query complexity lower bounds. 
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